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ABSTRACT: This study analyses the extent to which the recent economic crisis influences the political atti-
tudes that are fundamental to legitimacy of a democratic system of government. The article focuses on 
two questions: how much does crisis exposure affect democratic legitimacy attitudes? And what is the role 
played by social mobility perspective on this effect? 
The findings, based on a sample of the Life in Transition Survey II, show that economic crisis exposure sig-
nificantly affects political legitimacy attitudes. The results confirm that higher crisis exposure is associated 
with lower legitimacy. Additionally, the present research rules out the possibility that crisis exposure af-
fects attitudes in a specific way, depending on the expected mobility valence. While replicating previous 
evidence supporting the negative democratic effect of adverse economic changes, the current research 
sheds light on the critical role that the future perspective plays in determining this effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Great recession in Europe since 2008 has affected (and it is still affecting) the lives of 
millions of people, exacerbating social exclusion, unemployment, poverty and inequality 
(OECD 2013), with relevant consequences detected at the individual level. In fact, in the 
last years, many research have pointed out its individual consequences and its negative im-
pact on people’s well-being: for example, poor self-rated health (Zavras, Tsiantou, Pavi, My-
lona, and Kyriopoulos 2012), unhappiness (Gudmundsdottir 2013), anger and depression 
(Ragnarsdòttir, Bernburg, and Olafsdottir 2013), as well as anxiety (Gili, Roca, Basu, McKee, 
and Stuckler 2012).  
However, in addition to the psychological consequences, evaluating also whether and 
how the recent crisis influences different attitudes related to the quality of democracy 
(e.g., political trust, support for democracy) has yet received little attention (Bermeo and 
Bartels 2014). In fact, in times of crisis, the diffusion of negative orientations can be deter-
minant to undermine the order and the social stability of some countries (e.g., Bermeo 
2003; Rothermund 1996), in which the economic systems are already highly stressed by the 
crisis since 2008. In particular, in the affluent countries of Europe a prolonged period of 
economic growth preceded the recent economic crisis, and research points out that a crisis 
is particularly conducive to frustration if it occurs suddenly after a prolonged period of in-
creasing prosperity (Davies 1962). 
Additionally, to date, there are few studies that provide empirical evidence on potential 
moderators of the impact of crises on political attitudes (e.g., see Polavieja 2013; Torcal 
2014). In this study it is argued that more attention than is usually given should be paid to 
the role of the expected social mobility to account for the strength of attitudinal conse-
quences of the crisis exposure. The rationale for this prediction is mainly based on more 
general sociological approaches to “relative deprivation” theory (Runciman 1966; Rag-
narsdòttir et al. 2013), emphasizing the important role of subjective comparison processes 
in distress during an economic collapse, with a generalized objective downgrading of mate-
rial conditions. Specifically, competition feeling may generate hostility toward the politics 
and the democratic system mostly when a perspective of downward mobility is present; to 
experience a process of social downgrading may elicit a perception of unfair disadvantage, 
facilitating the attribution of responsibility to the inefficiency of politics and political sys-
tem.  
The present study aims to address these gaps in the empirical literature by (1) exploring 
the individual differences in the democratic legitimacy attitudes due to crisis exposure in 
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some Eurozone countries, and (2) examining whether these attitudinal differences are 
moderated by relative mobility.  
This article is structured as follows. In the first section, a brief literature review on politi-
cal impact of economic shocks, with an emphasis on potential moderating role of relative 
mobility, is provided. Database, variables and empirical model are described in the meth-
ods section. The next section reports the results of the empirical tests. The final section 
concludes with a summary of empirical findings and discusses their implications, briefly ex-
ploring possible future research perspectives. 
 
 
2. Economic downturn and “crisis” of political legitimacy 
 
Political legitimacy can be defined as the quality of “oughtness” that is perceived by the 
public to inhere in a political regime (Merelman, 1966). More specifically, following Lipset 
(1960), the political “legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and main-
tain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 
society”. Starting from this concept of political legitimacy, the assumed positive relation-
ship between economic condition and political legitimacy can be traced back to the well-
known debates about economic development as a prerequisite of a participant and demo-
cratic society (Lipset, 1959; Smith, 1972). Specifically, in order to explain the beginning of 
the democratization process, the classical thesis of modernization (Lipset, 1960) argues 
that democracy and its legitimacy are favoured by the economic development, so much so 
that it is argued that dictatorships have more difficulties to politically survive when eco-
nomic growth is high (Dahl, 1971: 78). Not surprisingly, when economic well-being and ex-
istential security increase in societies, daily life experiences of individuals change, bringing 
them to give greater weight to democratic goals that were previously given low priority, 
such as freedom of expression (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Friedman, 2005).  
As well as virtuous, the circle can be vicious. Friedman highlights the potential civic con-
sequences of a negative economic performance: “Many countries with highly developed 
economies, including America, have experienced alternating eras of economic growth and 
stagnation in which their democratic values have strengthened or weakened accordingly” 
(Friedman, 2005: 5). Such as economic growth promotes optimism, greater openness, tol-
erance and democracy, at the same time economic deterioration can adversely reshape the 
democratic culture of a community, making a democracy more deficient in terms of politi-
cal legitimacy. According to this view, several studies have investigated the civic and demo-
cratic impact of sudden and unexpected material deteriorations, such as those resulting 
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from an economic crisis. It is reported that a popular reaction to an economic crisis can be-
come dramatic and significant (Lindvall, 2013). In times of crisis, people could turn their 
backs to democracy (Bermeo, 2003) and the economic distress generated by crises may 
produce “combustible potential” (Achen and Bartels, 2005: 34) capable of triggering socio-
political change. Several studies investigated political attitudes, confirming that these mac-
roeconomic events may affect political interest and political trust (McAllister, 1999; Mishler 
and Rose, 2001). The economic insecurity affects the same perceptions that people have 
about the social impact of the crisis, influencing also their trust in political institutions and 
incumbent government (Ross and Escobar-Lemmon, 2009), and generating anti-democratic 
consequences (Cordova and Seligson, 2009; Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004). In this regard, 
it is also argued that the rise of the totalitarian regimes antecedents to World War II are 
connected directly to the legitimacy crisis of democracies, triggered by the global economic 
depression of 1929: in that period, a global public opinion change was sparked, favouring 
European fascism and Latin America populism (Rothermund, 1996).  
In sum, the literature review set forth here indicates that most of the previous studies 
suggest potential democratic legitimacy risks due to the economic shocks. Most of these 
studies focused on South American and Asian countries, who experienced significant eco-
nomic recessions in more remote years (e.g. Remmer, 1991; Davis and Langley, 1995; Hayo, 
2005; Turner and Carballo, 2005). However, the relevance of this research question is be-
coming increasingly important also in established Western democracies, who have experi-
enced high levels of income and well-being before the onset of the recent economic crisis 
(e.g., Bermeo and Bartels, 2014). In recent years, this interest is even more evident by the 
presence of different projects financed by EU and focused on citizens’ attitudes and partic-
ipation in relation to the crisis (e.g., “Livewhat”, “POLCON” or “ REScEU” projects). 
Additionally, literature shows that the political legitimacy is best understood as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon (Norris, 2001; Easton, 1965), ranging from the most generalized 
confidence and trust in the regime and its institutions, down to specific approval of particu-
lar authorities and leaders. Following this literature, this study aims to evaluate the political 
legitimacy in terms of attitudes by investigating at two distinguishable and independent 
levels: at both specific and general levels. In particular, the political systems obtain legiti-
macy in so far as the public supports a system’s concrete institutions as well as the system 
as a totality (Easton, 1965); it is essential for the efficiency and functioning of democratic 
system that citizens have confidence in political institutions and prefer democracy to any 
alternative system of government (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Newton and Norris, 2000). 
As a consequence, it is empirically important in this study to distinguish these two levels: 
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on the one hand, the satisfaction and confidence in democratic institutions, on the other 
hand, the detachment from democratic values and democracy as political system. 
Therefore, it can be expected that the crisis exposure significantly affects the democratic 
legitimacy attitudes, both specific and general ones, in addition to the main socio-
demographic and status characteristics; in particular, individuals who experience higher cri-
sis exposure are more likely to delegitimise political institutions and democratic system 
(Hp1).  
 
 
3. How much does the future perspective matter in hard times? 
 
Little is known about the effects of the recent economic crisis on political legitimacy atti-
tudes, but the mechanisms through which the crisis may more specifically influence those 
attitudes remain even more unexplored. This study hypothesizes that the way in which in-
dividuals evaluate their future social trajectory, may be the crucial mechanism underlying a 
potential democratic “recession”.  
This argument is supported by more general sociological approaches to “relative depri-
vation”, which claim that the subjective reality of individuals is more significant to them 
than their objective reality (Runciman, 1966). More specifically, how people perceive their 
situations in comparison to salient reference points may create feelings of relative depriva-
tion (Crosby, 1976; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, and Bialosiewicz 2011), influencing the effects 
of objective economic hardship on attitudes. Moreover, in times of crisis, in presence of a 
generalized objective downgrading of material conditions, subjective comparisons may be-
come even more significant (Ragnarsdòttir et al., 2013).  
In fact, with reference to expected social mobility, there are at least two potential ways 
to react to crisis exposure. On the one hand, though a person does experience objectively 
downward material change, he may view it as a temporary situation because of private 
knowledge about skills and plans that will improve his situation in the future. At the same 
time, he may perceive his material worsening as a common condition in times of crisis, to 
the point of not evaluate his social positioning as decreasing, but stable or even increasing. 
In those cases, regardless of the current position, upward expected mobility and the per-
ception of abundant opportunities lessen frustration and the feelings of injustice, diminish-
ing the attribution of responsibility to the inefficiency of political institutions and system 
(Wegener, 1991). 
On the other hand, the emergence of a generalized feeling of economic insecurity may 
become fear of social downgrading, leading individuals to evaluate that the crisis harms 
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them more than other members of the society. This framework of competitive pressure is 
rooted in a perspective of downward expected mobility and in a consequent perception of 
unfair disadvantage due to inefficiency of politics and system of government. In this case, 
crisis exposure could lead to hostility toward political institutions as well as the system as a 
totality.  
Consistently, literature also stresses the significant role of valence of social mobility 
(upward vs. downward) in terms of legitimacy toward the system. For example, building on 
relative deprivation theory, Krahn and Harrison (1992) find that people who perceive a so-
cial downgrading during a recession indicate more support for government redistribution, 
triggering grievance toward the social order. At the same time, people who experience up-
ward mobility are less likely to justify anticivic behaviour, as tax evasion (Daude and Mel-
guizo, 2011), and tend to legitimize the system that will allow them to move ahead (Scalon 
and Cano, 2008). It is also shown that the experience and expectation of upward mobility 
may contribute to the social and political stability (Zhiming, 2013) developing generalized 
political trust. 
Consequently, expected social mobility may then reflect processes that explain its influ-
ence on the issue of how crisis exposure comes to be translated into risks to political legit-
imacy and stability. For individuals who are more heavily exposed to the crisis, but predict 
upward mobility, a better perspective for the future may help to cope with the sense of un-
fairness or the anger toward the political institutions. At the same time, individuals who 
failed to improve their lot may be democratically vulnerable when they expect also to ex-
perience downward mobility.  
Consequently, it is hypothesized that expected mobility significantly interacts with crisis 
exposure to influence democratic legitimacy attitudes, and that the effect of crisis exposure 
on attitudes critically depends on the expected mobility. In particular, it is expected that 
those who experience downward mobility are more likely to report political dissatisfaction 
as a consequence of the level of crisis exposure. On the contrary, the perception of upward 
mobility is likely to have a compensatory effect, significantly neutralizing the negative atti-
tudinal impact generated by crisis exposure (Hp2). 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
The aim of the study is to understand the impact of material change generated by crisis 
exposure on democratic legitimacy attitudes, and the role played by expected social mobili-
ty on this impact. As previously seen, many studies investigated how economic and materi-
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al conditions may influence beliefs and attitudes. This rapidly expanding empirical litera-
ture, however, has so far treated the economic status mostly from a static perspective and 
failed to consider the effects of dynamic changes in one’s status, either realized or antici-
pated. In fact, changes in economic conditions might be more relevant than absolute levels 
of economic status with regard to understanding of political attitudes. This dynamic formu-
lation is particularly useful in times of economic crisis, when severe shocks can suddenly 
affect personal as well as national economic conditions. Following this logic, a marginal pre-
crisis social position could remain constant without changing political attitudes, and it is on-
ly if sudden changes in economic conditions occur that attitudes change (Billiet, Meuleman, 
and De Witte 2014).  
A strict test of this dynamic argument would ideally require analysing longitudinal survey 
data during the crisis. Unfortunately, such data sources are unavailable at present. This 
study adopts a different approach, confining itself to the analysis of data from a single time 
point (namely the 2010 round of the LiTS) and using retrospective and perspective meas-
urements that record individual changes in socio-economic conditions. Thereby, the ap-
proach of this study allows to examine relative changes rather than absolute levels of ma-
terial condition, studying the latter as the result of social trajectories, realized (crisis expo-
sure) and anticipated (expected mobility). 
 
Data 
The hypotheses are tested using data of Life in Transition Survey II (LiTS II). LiTS II, con-
ducted jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Bank in 2010, surveyed almost 39.000 households in 34 countries (mainly in the former 
communist East) to assess public attitudes, well-being and the impacts of economic and po-
litical change. The survey provides vivid evidence of precisely how lives are affected by the 
global economic crisis and its aftermath. The joint sample (N = 3.100) of the three partici-
pating Eurozone countries is selected (France, Germany, Italy) for two main reasons. Firstly, 
as previously reported, this study assumes particular relevance in the context of affluent 
European countries because they have experienced high levels of economic growth and in-
creasing prosperity before the recent economic recession, with high expectations internal-
ized by people about their economic future. Secondly, the choice to focus on specific Euro-
zone countries also guarantees a sample composed of a relatively homogeneous group of 
countries, distinguishable from the other ones surveyed in reference to both the similar ini-
tial impact of the economic crisis and the level of democratic and civic maturity.  
 
Dependent variables 
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This study uses two main dimensions to define and measure the attitudinal components 
of democratic legitimacy, distinguishing between specific (or institutional) and general (or 
systemic) approach. As previously stressed, both such approaches follow the tradition of 
political culture school (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), emphasizing that a broader set of civic 
attitudes and values are important for the efficiency and functioning of democratic system. 
The political systems obtain legitimacy in so far as the public supports a system’s concrete 
institutions (specific approach) as well as the system as a totality (general approach).  
Specific legitimacy approach. Following the specific legitimacy dimension, the political 
impact of economic crisis may be evaluated by its influence on two attitudes toward politi-
cal institutions: government dissatisfaction and political distrust. For the first dimension, 
the following sentence is used: “Please rate the overall performance of national govern-
ment” (from “very bad” = 1, to “very good” = 5). To calculate the final score (0-10), the item 
is reversed scored, with the higher scores reflecting maximum dissatisfaction. 
Beyond the government dissatisfaction, public confidence in institutions is the attitudi-
nal indicator more reliable to measure the absence of political legitimacy at a specific level. 
In order to measure political distrust, respondents are asked about their level of trust to-
ward some democratic institutions (Parliament, political parties, Presidency, Govern-
ment/Cabinet of Ministers)1: “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” (1 = 
complete distrust, 5 = complete trust). The final index (α = .81) is rescaled, with the higher 
scores reflecting maximum political distrust (0-10). 
General legitimacy approach. Compared to specific approach, the general one does 
stress the political importance of attitudes that have a strong linkage with liberty aspira-
tions and support for democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Consequently, the effects of 
crisis exposure are evaluated using two further indexes: anti-libertarian tendency and de-
tachment from democracy as political system. 
Anti-libertarian tendency gauges the tendency of respondents to give up political liber-
ties. By doing this, respondents are asked the following dichotomous question: “Now I am 
going to switch and ask you a different kind of question. It will be and hypothetical ques-
tion. Imagine you could choose between living in two countries, Country A and Country B. 
Country A has few political liberties but strong economic growth. Country B has full political 
 
1
 The four institutions were selected from a larger battery of seven institutions (Presidency, Goverment/Cabinet of Min-
isters, Parliament, courts, political parties, armed forces, police). A preliminary principal-components factor analysis 
(oblimin rotation) yielded a two-factor solution (Pearson’s r = .39), showing that the four political institutions adequate-
ly capture one single factor of conceptual interest for this study (the factor accounted the 51% of the variance), distin-
guishing by the institutions maintaining control and social order (the second factor accounted for 16%).  
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liberties but weak economic growth. Which country would you rather live in?” (Country A = 
1; Country B = 0).  
Anti-democracy attitude is based on one item assessing respondents’ views about the 
democracy as form of political system. Following Klingemann (1999), arguing that support 
for democracy should be measured in relation to support for alternative regimes, it is used 
a preference for democracy item. Specifically, interviewees are asked the following ques-
tion: “With which one of the following three statements do you agree most?”. Three 
statements included are: A) “Democracy is preferable to any other form of political sys-
tem”, B) “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a 
democratic one”, C) “For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is dem-
ocratic or authoritarian”. Considering that the objective of the present analysis is to meas-
ure the detachment from democracy (independently by type of detachment), this categori-
cal variable has been dichotomized: preference for democracy (0) vs anti-democratic alter-
natives (1). 
 
Independent variable 
Crisis exposure. The crisis exposure is assessed by using the responses to the following 
question included in the section of the LiTS questionnaire entitled “Impact of the crisis”: “In 
the past two years, have you or anyone else in your household had to take any of the fol-
lowing measures as the result of a decline in income or other economic difficulty?”. This is 
followed by a battery of 16 behaviours (e.g., “Reduced use of car”, “Reduced vacations”), in 
which exploratory factor analysis shows the presence of several factors (e. g., payment de-
fault, reduced consumption of basic goods and services, etc.). However, the goal is not to 
assess the role played by different types of hardship, but to quantify the extent of the ma-
terial lifestyle change because of limited economic resources. Consequently, also consider-
ing that the final reliability index does not vary even when the less-correlated items are 
omitted, all the listed items are included. The composite index is operationalized as fre-
quency of carried-out behaviours, measuring not a static material status but a fundamen-
tally dynamic lifestyle change2.  
 
Moderating variable 
Expected mobility. In order to measure the expected mobility, as potential moderator 
and resource to avoid negative effects of crisis exposure, it is used a composite index. Peo-
 
2
 Each behaviour may have a specific subjective value and may be perceived as more or less depriving than other be-
haviours; however, this information (the perceived importance) is not asked in the questionnaire. 
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ple are considered subjectively mobile if they perceive their own future place in society as 
higher or lower than the current one.  
Two self-placement questions are used to construct a composite index. The first ques-
tion asks the respondents to assess their current socioeconomic position with respect to 
the people in their country: “Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the 
first step, stand the poorest 10% people in our country, and on the highest step, the tenth, 
stand the richest 10% of people in our country. On which step of the ten is your household 
today?”. The second question measures their expectation about future position: “And 
where on the ladder do you believe your household will be 4 years from now?”. The differ-
ence between the second answer and the first one does reflect the balance of expected 
mobility in the near future (a positive score means a more ascendant mobility, a negative 
score means a more descendant mobility). 
 
Control variables 
Models are assessed using linear regression analyses and controlling for potentially con-
founding variables: gender, age, educational level, occupational status and country. Gender 
is a dummy variable with the value 0 for women and 1 for men. Participants are catego-
rized by age into three groups: young adults (ages 18-34 years), middle-aged adults (ages 
35-54 years) and older adults (aged older 54). Educational level is trichotomized into prima-
ry or lower secondary level, upper secondary level and tertiary or more level. Occupational 
status is recoded into three categories: employed, unemployed, other (not working catego-
ry that includes students, homemakers and retired persons). 
 
 
The empirical model 
The empirical model is summarized in Figure 1. The general hypothesis (Hp1) states that 
life conditions worsening (level of crisis exposure) may increase anti-democratic legitimacy 
attitudes: political distrust, government dissatisfaction, anti-libertarian tendency, detach-
ment from democracy.  
These effects are tested by controlling some sociodemographic and social status charac-
teristics potentially related to the level of crisis exposure.  
Further, it is hypothesized that expected mobility may play a compensatory role in 
moderating the effects of crisis exposure on democratic legitimacy attitudes (Hp2). Follow-
ing Baron and Kenny’s (1986) model of moderation, in a second step attitude is regressed 
on crisis exposure (the predictor) and expected mobility (the moderator), followed by their 
interaction term (crisis exposure by expected mobility). A moderator effect is present if the 
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interaction between moderator variable and predictor variable is significant while the in-
dependent effect of each is statistically controlled (Baron and Kenny, 1986). To test such a 
moderation prediction and to validate the model’s reliability, the same regression analyses 
are performed on each of four political attitudes. 
 
Figure 1. The empirical model used to test the hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, to control for variation across countries, standard errors of the models are 
clustered by country, becoming robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation3. After a 
few years from the start of the crisis, it is widely known that European countries have expe-
rienced specific economic dynamics, different enough to identify more types of crises in Eu-
rope also in relation to the public discourse (Zamponi and Bosi, 2016). However, the empir-
ical generalizability of the hypothesized model could be considered valid for the three sur-
veyed countries for two main reasons.  
Firstly, OECD data showed that the arrival of the crisis had led to a generalized decline 
in GDP in 2009 in Europe, affecting the various euro area countries analysed and their 
common currency. In fact, the economic performances of the three countries began to sig-
nificantly differentiate only from 2010 onwards: in 2011 France and Germany registered 
slow growth trend, while Italy remained at negative values. The LiTS II survey was conduct-
 
3
 When the number of country cases is large, the use of mixed models or multilevel modelling is an effective way to 
assess contextual variation and how it decreases as country variables are added. With only three countries, however, 
such models do not provide reliable estimates. As a result, the analyses are based on a series of fixed-effects general-
ized linear models. Preliminary models were also fitted, including a set of country dummy regressors and specifying in-
teractions between country and various explanatory variables. None of the interaction effects were substantively large, 
however, so they were removed from the reported models in order to simplify interpretation. 
Hp2 
Hp1 
Crisis exposure 
Control variables 
(sex, age, educational 
level, occupational sta-
tus) 
 
 
Expected mobility 
Political legitimacy 
attitudes 
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ed in 2010, as a consequence it could be expected that the crisis event has not yet created 
significant differentiation among the analysed countries.  
Secondly, the predictive model described above identifies the crisis exposure using an 
individual-level measure (intended as personal lifestyle change). According to the literature 
reviewed, there is no reason to suppose that in 2010 the individual crisis exposure elicits 
different attitudinal reactions among people living in countries similarly affected by a 
common external event. In fact, it is hypothesized that people who are more crisis exposed 
have those hypothesized reactions compared to those less exposed, both in Germany, as 
well as in France and Italy. In any case, as already stressed, once the standard errors are 
clusterized to control a potential country effect, it will be possible to generalize to all three 
countries. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Specific legitimacy approach 
As indicated in the methods section, following a specific political legitimacy approach, 
institutional distrust and citizens' dissatisfaction with the way government works represent 
two fundamental attitudes that can weaken the political legitimacy (Inglehart and Welzel, 
2005). Table 1 presents the results of the linear regression models. In the two models 1, 
the predictors include both the key-independent variable (level of crisis exposure) and the 
control variables (sex, age, education, and occupational status). Given the hypothesis re-
garding the impact of material deteriorating on political attitudes (Hp1), the main interest 
is on crisis exposure, whilst the other variables are considered as controls.  
In support of the hypothesis, results indicate an effect of crisis exposure such that more 
crisis exposure is associated with lower political legitimacy. As shows table 1, controlling 
the sociodemographic and social status characteristics, crisis exposure is significant in each 
one of the two models 1 (β = .20 and p < .001 for government dissatisfaction, β = .15 and p 
< .001 for political distrust). In particular, increases in crisis exposure are associated with 
increases in government dissatisfaction and political distrust. 
Further, some of the control variables are significantly related to political attitudes. Be-
yond the crisis exposure level, higher government dissatisfaction is reported by unem-
ployed as well as higher distrust is perceived by lower educated and unemployed. 
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Table 1. Specific legitimacy approach: effects of crisis exposure on political attitudes (model 1) and moderating role of 
upward mobility (model 2). Linear regressions (standardized coefficients). 
 Government dissatisfaction Political distrust 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Gender (ref: Male)  0.03   0.07 -0.10  -0.07 
Age (ref: Over 54) 
18-34 
 
 0.12 
 
 0.38* 
 
-0.09 
 
  0.12 
35-54   0.24°   0.37** -0.07   0.03 
Education (ref: Tertiary) 
Primary or lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
 
 0.46*** 
0.34** 
 
  0.42** 
 0.31* 
  
 0.21° 
-0.01 
 
  0.15 
    -0.07 
Occupational status (ref: Employed) 
Unemployed 
 
 0.24* 
 
  0.21° 
 
    0.49*** 
 
   0.42*** 
Other     0.05  0.01  0.01   -0.05 
Crisis exposure   0.20***    0.38***     0.15***   0.27** 
Upward mobility 
Crisis exposure by Upward mobility 
Constant 
Adj R-squared 
(N) 
 
 
  5.16*** 
4,0% 
(2,483) 
 -0.25** 
 -0.05** 
  6.41*** 
6,6% 
(2,337) 
 
 
 
   5.78*** 
3,5% 
(2,539) 
   -0.27*** 
-0.04* 
   7.16*** 
5,6% 
(2,378) 
Note: The sample includes all the three Eurozone Western countries surveyed: France, Germany, Italy (LiTS II, 2010). 
Standard errors are clusterized by country and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *** = p < 0.001; 
** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; ° = p < 0.1 
 
Most importantly, it is hypothesized that expected mobility would moderate the impact 
of crisis exposure on political attitudes. For this reason, the crisis exposure by expected 
mobility interaction for each attitude are introduced in models 2 (also including the main 
effect of expected mobility). Table 1 shows that the interaction effect is significant both on 
government satisfaction (β = -.05 and p < .01) and political distrust (β = -.04 and p < .05). 
For both dimensions, the addition of the interaction term to the model yields a significant 
contribution to the regression equation (p < .05). This finding indicates that expected mo-
bility is a moderator of the crisis-political legitimacy relationship. 
The direction of the regression coefficient for the interaction term is negative and shows 
that, as expected mobility increases in ascendant terms, the strength of the crisis-
legitimacy relation significantly weakens.  
As regards the specific legitimacy approach, these findings are in line with the expectations, 
which means that both hypotheses Hp1 and Hp2 are confirmed by the data. 
 
General legitimacy approach  
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Following a general legitimacy approach, low levels of confidence in political institutions 
do not necessarily also involve a threat to democracy, if a general preference for democra-
cy as system of government is also largely diffused (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Newton and 
Norris 2000). Using the general legitimacy indexes, are the predicted effects significant as 
well? General detachment from democracy is measured through two additional indexes: 
anti-libertarian tendency and anti-democracy attitude.  
Regarding the anti-libertarian tendency, the analysis presents results that are similar to 
those shown earlier. Reference may be made to table 2 showing the same tests presented 
in table 1, except using logistic regressions. In particular, controlling the sociodemographic 
and social status characteristics, increases in crisis exposure are found be associated with 
increases in anti-libertarian tendency (b = .06 and p < .01). In model 2, the crisis exposure 
by expected mobility interaction term is significant (b = -.04 and p = .05). Also in this case, 
the negative valence of the interaction coefficient shows that, as upward mobility increas-
es, the strength of the crisis effect on the attitude weakens. Finally, regarding the anti-
democracy attitude, crisis exposure has no effect on the attitude in model 1 (b = .03 and p 
> .10), and the crisis-mobility interaction results significant (b = -.04 and p = .05). 
In summary, results confirm the hypotheses using a specific legitimacy approach, but 
they are not fully confirmed using a general legitimacy approach. However, to better inter-
pret the interaction effect, a categorical index is used to distinguish respondents into three 
mobility groups: no mobility (a future positioning identical to the present one), ascendant 
mobility (a future positioning higher than the present one) and descendant mobility (a fu-
ture positioning lower than the present one). 
In figure 2 are plotted the predicted margins of political attitudes by crisis exposure and 
type of mobility, while controlling for sociodemographic and social status variables.  
These graphs show in detail how crisis exposure is more predictive of political attitudes 
to the extent that expected mobility is descendant. As the citizens evaluate future mobility 
as worsening, their political legitimacy attitudes significantly decrease in relation to the cri-
sis exposure level. In other words, people exposed to the crisis show lower levels of politi-
cal legitimacy, mostly when the perspective of social downgrading is also present. The 
graphs show that the effect of the social downgrading does appear to be present on each 
of four attitudes, even though the crisis-legitimacy interaction is only marginally significant 
on general legitimacy attitudes. At the same time, when citizens prospectively evaluate 
their future mobility as ascendant, their political legitimacy attitudes tend to be independ-
ent of the crisis exposure level. Consequently, this result is consistent with the idea that the 
prospective of upward mobility does play a compensatory role in attenuating the risks of 
crisis exposure on political attitudes.  
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Table 2. General legitimacy approach: effects of crisis exposure on political attitudes (model 1) and moderating role 
of upward mobility (model 2). Logistic regressions (unstandardized coefficients and standard errors in parentheses). 
 Anti-libertarian tendency 
(0=full liberties, 1=few liber-
ties) 
Anti-democracy attitude 
(0=pro-democracy, 1=anti-
democracy) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Gender (ref: Male) 0.25** 0.28** 0.13 0.13 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.094) (0.097) 
Age (ref: Over 54) 
18-34 
 
0.35** 
 
0.26° 
 
0.21 
 
0.23 
 (0.132) (0.141) (0.143) (0.154) 
35-54 0.19 0.14 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.116) (0.121) (0.127) (0.132) 
Education (ref: Tertiary) 
Primary or lower secon. 
 
Upper secondary 
 
1.04*** 
(0.124) 
0.76*** 
 
1.05*** 
(0.128) 
0.77*** 
 
1.24*** 
(0.153) 
0.94*** 
 
1.25*** 
(0.158) 
0.94*** 
 (0.120) (0.124) (0.151) (0.156) 
Occupational status (ref: Employed) 
Unemployed 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.16 
 
0.13 
 (0.110) (0.115) (0.118) (0.123) 
Other 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.15 
 (0.117) (0.121) (0.129) (0.134) 
Crisis exposure 0.06** 0.24* 0.03 0.18* 
 (0.023) (0.094) (0.024) (0.090) 
Upward mobility 
 
 0.08 
(0.069) 
 0.02 
(0.074) 
Crisis exposure by Upward mobility 
 
 -0.04* 
(0.020) 
 -0.04* 
(0.020) 
Constant 1.30*** 
(0.169) 
-1.67*** 
(0.367) 
2.00*** 
(0.179) 
-2.07*** 
(0.401) 
Pseudo R-squared 
(N) 
3,3% 
(2,424) 
3,6% 
(2,278) 
3,1% 
(2,483) 
3,5% 
(2,334) 
Note: The sample includes all the three Eurozone Western countries surveyed: France, Germany, Italy (LiTS II, 2010). 
Standard errors are clusterized by country and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. *** = p < 0.001; 
** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; ° = p < 0.1 
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Figure 2. Predictive margins of democratic legitimacy attitudes by crisis exposure and expected mobility. 
SPECIFIC LEGITIMACY APPROACH 
 
GENERAL LEGITIMACY APPROACH 
 
Note: calculations are based on Models 2 (Tables 1 and 2); all other included covariates are set to their means. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In line with the previous empirical evidence stressing the presence of democratic deficit 
in times of crisis (e.g., Bermeo 2003; Turner and Carballo, 2005; Remmer, 1991), the results 
of this study shows that the recent economic crisis is able to provoke an attitudinal “crisis” 
of political legitimacy in the European countries surveyed. Specifically, consistent effects 
are observed in three of four attitudes evaluated: increases in crisis exposure are found be 
associated with increases in government dissatisfaction, political distrust and anti-
libertarian tendency. Consistent with previous literature, the rationale for this result is that 
the material worsening generated by the crisis may increase the sense of dissatisfaction 
toward political institutions, producing also a disruption in political values that are central 
to democracy itself. In particular, a material shock may have destructive effects on political 
legitimacy when future risks and costs related to the shock are not perceived as equally dis-
tributed. In relation to this point, a significant level of crisis exposure may not be enough in 
order to trigger consequences on political legitimacy, if it is not also accompanied by per-
ception of substantive social unfairness. 
The results show that these effects are relatively strong for the specific legitimacy ap-
proach and weaker for the general one, confirming that lack of confidence in the political 
institutions is much more unstable and sensitive to contextual factors (e.g., Torcal and 
Montero, 2006) compared to questioning of political regime. After all, the literature on col-
lective action that look at political legitimacy attitudes (Gamson, 1968; Norris, 2001; Tilly, 
2007) shows us that extent of political disaffection could not manifest itself in “democratic 
deficits”. On the contrary, a fall in political trust in the public institutions of mature liberal 
democracies could also favour new forms of democratic governance (della Porta, 2013) and 
critical citizens can be considered as better democrats than deferential ones as they tended 
to choose voice over exit, in line with a need for more democracy (Norris, 2001).  
Secondly, it was expected that future mobility would moderate the impact of the crisis 
on attitudes. The analyses provide clear, albeit preliminary, support for the moderation hy-
pothesis, showing that expected relative mobility influences the strength of the crisis-
legitimacy relationship. Results then confirm that expected mobility may become a key fac-
tor in times of crisis (Ragnarsdòttir et al., 2013): when actual material conditions become 
worse than in the past, future perspective plays a role even more significant on the attribu-
tion of responsibility to political system. 
The impact of the crisis appears to be particularly high for people with downward mobil-
ity, with the coefficient associated with political attitudes always statistically significant. 
This indicates that a democratic “recession” may also occur among those who do not be-
long to civically marginal groups, in the event that they are uncertain and afraid of their fu-
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ture social position. By contrast, such impact is not significant in people that expect upward 
mobility. The perspective of upward mobility works as a protective barrier from the fraying 
of democratic fabric generated by the economic crisis. As a consequence, no matter how 
dramatic and intense the crisis exposure may be, because it is not only important what you 
get today than yesterday, but also where you think you might end up tomorrow compared 
to others. Even a large drop in the standard of living may not trigger much political hostility 
and sense of unfairness toward institutions and democracy, if individuals think that the cri-
sis in perspective harms them less than most others. Conversely, even a small drop in the 
standard of living may create risks of political legitimacy if individuals perceive that the cri-
sis has an unequal impact, worsening their own future social positioning more than one of 
the others.  
The findings may provide a clue as to why economic crises sometimes have only weak 
civic effects. Beyond individual differences due to personality traits (pessimism, fear, etc.), 
evidence relating to expected mobility suggests that the impact of the crisis on political at-
titudes can be context specific. When the economy stagnates and material goods become 
scarcer, the perception that those goods are locked in a zero-sum game becomes more in-
tense, leading to intensify levels of social competition, as if to say: “Mors tua, vita mea”. 
Future perspective may then depend on the duration and severity of the economic reces-
sion, and consequently by the type of austerity measures and by significant social protec-
tion schemes introduced by the government. Policy, raising the income of the population in 
relatively smaller extent, but continuously and providing new opportunities for individuals, 
may induce higher expectations of mobility. A large but single raising in income without fu-
ture prospects of further increase generates less decrease in uncertainty than the smaller, 
but permanent, income raising with prospects confirming future improvements.  
However, the current study has some limitations that need acknowledgment. Firstly, by 
performing empirical analysis using four different attitudes, this study provides a robust as-
sessment of the relationship between crisis exposure and political legitimacy. Although the 
replication of our findings across a range of different attitudes is a strength of this research, 
a complete replication of this study with more multi-item scales would be desirable. 
Additionally, material change generated by the crisis is measured not by using longitudi-
nal data but retrospective questions. Future research should establish the generality of the 
results reported in the current investigation by conducting within-participants studies.  
Further, these empirical findings may initiate a careful reassessment of risks of political 
legitimacy in economically more prosperous contexts in future research on determinants of 
political attitudes. The large sample of this study, including all the Eurozone countries sur-
veyed in the LiTS II dataset, provides a robust evidence base in relation to the recent eco-
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nomic crisis, moving beyond single-country studies. However, it remains to be confirmed 
whether this empirical evidence is a distinctive feature of the Eurozone - and of countries 
that already have high incomes and established democracies - or whether the relationship 
between economic crisis and political legitimacy is a general empirical fact also in economi-
cally less developed and politically less stable countries. At the same time, it may be further 
interesting to distinguish European countries in relation to future prospects of economic 
growth, in order to investigate whether the political impact of the recent economic crisis is 
more significant in Southern than Northern countries, eliciting a sort of “democratic di-
vide”.  
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